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A COUNTRY WITHIN A COUNTRY:
REDRAWING BORDERS ON
THE POST-COLONIAL SOVEREIGN STATE
Suzan Dionne Balz*
This Essay seeks to identify the conflict that exists between the de-
mands for self-governance by Canada's First Nations and the interests
of the Canadian state. The author elucidates this conflict by identifying
two major differences between the perspectives of Canada's First Na-
tions' demands for self-governance and the interests of the Canadian
state: the privileging of the collective versus the privileging of the indi-
vidual, and the two very different notions of "territory." The author
concludes that the doctrine of sovereign statehood as developed out of
European Nationalism stands as an obstacle to the self-determination of
non-western peoples such as the First Nations because it requires the
people within the territory of the state to have no allegiance apart from
the state. Yet the author concludes that it is precisely this doctrine of
sovereignty that may lead to some possibility for reconciliation. Inter-
national organizations, created in the post-war era in response to the
realization that global problems need global administration, offer a
model, in that they have international administrative jurisdictions di-
rectly in contravention of the territorial sovereignty of states. The
author argues that territory is no longer necessarily the characteristic
of a political entity in the international arena, and therefore it is possi-
ble to imagine the recognition of stateless nations as subjects of
international law.
INTRODUCTION
The reconciliation of the conflicting interests of First Nations'
and of the Canadian state is now considered imperative for a just
* Legal Manager, Deloitte & Touche Consultants. B.A. 1987, Queen's University;
M.A. 1991, Concordia University; LL.B. 1995 Universit6 de Montreal Law Faculty.
The author expresses thanks to her friends whose opinions and ideas have
greatly contributed to the researching of this Essay, and all those who stood at Oka
and provoked yet another symptom of crisis.
1. "First Nations" is a term that refers to the indigenous peoples that lived in coun-
tries such as Canada prior to its colonization by Europeans. See also infra notes 10-12
and accompanying text (summarizing First Nations' demands for self-determination);
Part I.B (identifying First Nations' demands).
2. This has not always been the case. The instances of disrespect for First Nations
self-government in Canada are too numerous to list and, for Canadians at least, consti-
tute a well-known litany. Salient examples nonetheless include federal legislation from
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society, as is demonstrated by the abundance of literature written on
the subject, recent Canadian jurisprudence, and the constitutionali-
zation of First Nations rights in Section 35 of the Constitution Act of
1982.3 This significant change in attitude can be located in the impor-
tant disjunction between the colonialist and imperialist world of the
nineteenth century and the post-colonial world of the twentieth
century. Colonialism and imperialism continue today, but their
contemporary form is very different from their nineteenth-century
form, just as the Canadian, or more broadly, the Western,4 concept of
justice in the twentieth century differs in important ways from its
nineteenth-century counterpart. Although a thorough analysis of
this history is not within the scope of this Essay, it is possible to re-
mark that certain Western notions of justice, such as the liberal idea
of individual human rights, expanded to the international arena
immediately after the World Wars by means of newly created inter-
national instruments. The post-World War generations, whose
ambitions and goals are, in theory at least, organized around this
new center of belief in equal human rights and justice for all rather
than uniquely for the civilized or Western world, have a colonial
history that we now disavow and therefore feel bound to contend
with and to redress. 5
The demands of Canada's First Nations have only recently be-
come an object of discussion in the context of international law.
There are several reasons for this. Those who consider it an impera-
tive of social and legal justice to address the long-standing wrongs
perpetuated against First Nations have quite rightly focused on the
the early part of this century that prohibited traditional First Nations languages, relig-
ions, and forms of government, and imposed others in their place. See Rarihokwats,
Akwasasne: L'avnement de la 'Dnocratie,' 39 MEDIUM SCIENCES HUMAINES 17 (1991)
(discussing such measures imposed upon the First Nations people of Akwasasne).
Until the 1970s, the government position on First Nations communities was assimila-
tionist and sought the removal of any mention of them as a distinct people from the
Canadian Constitution. See Assembly of First Nations, The Story of the National Indian
Brotherhood and the Assembly of First Nations (visited April 1, 1997)
<http://www.afn.ca/afnstory.htn>. Finally, a profound racism existed more or less
openly in the 1960s and 1970s. This racism was reflected in media portrayals of First
Nations peoples as having one-word vocabularies and, remarkably, in the test pattern
of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation national television network, which dis-
played an "Indian" in a bulls-eye. That logo was later used by First Nations groups on
T-shirts as a form of protest.
3. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. II (Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada), §35.
4. The term "Western" is used here as a cultural designation rather than as a strictly
geographical designation and refers to concepts originating in Europe which later
migrated to other parts of the world such as Canada. It is intended to be understood
particularly in counterpoint to concepts of justice proper to First Nations peoples. For
this reason, as well as for the sake of brevity, First Nations peoples and concepts will
be referred to as "non-Western," despite their geographical proximity.
5. See infra Part I.A.
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avenues that would seem to lead to the most immediate and practi-
cal redress. Consequently, authors such as Michael Asch and Patrick
Macklem , as well as Brian Slattery,7 have focused on Canadian in-
ternal law because the Canadian judicial system, already having
expressed a certain willingness towards reform, 8 can effect change
relatively quickly and efficiently.9 These authors have provided ex-
cellent discussions of the problems and the possibilities in the
context of Canadian law. However, while Canadian internal law
may indeed be the most practical and immediate forum in which to
obtain the recognition and protection of certain rights belonging to
First Nations, ultimately it cannot reach the heart of the matter. Un-
derlying all of the particular rights claimed by First Nations is their
claim to self-determination or, more extremely, to self-government.
Any discussion of self-government within the context of an already
sovereign state such as Canada is thus incomplete, and may not be
able to offer the self-definition desired without questioning the con-
cept of the sovereign state itself.
In Canada, there are more than six hundred First Nations."
First Nations differ in their demands and in the degree and type of
self-determination sought. There are some who insist on an absolute
sovereignty-territorial integrity and an absolute right to self-
government in all its forms." Others seek an organized form of self-
6. Michael Asch & Patrick Macklen, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An
Essay on R. v. Sparrow, 29 A. L. REV. 498 (1991).
7. Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. B. REV. 727 (1987)
[hereinafter Slattery, Aboriginal Rights]; see also Brian Slattery, First Nations and the
Constitution: A Question of Trust, 71 CAN. B. REV. 261 (1992).
8. See discussion of Calder and Guerin infra Part I.A.
9. The following authors provide excellent discussions of the problems and ave-
nues in the context of Canadian law. See Asch & Macklem, supra note 6; Slattery,
Aboriginal Rights, supra note 7.
10. Assembly of First Nations, Description of the Assembly of First Nations (visited
Mar. 26, 1997) <http://www.afn.ca/afndesc.htm>.
11. The Iroquois Confederacy, for example, "has historically insisted that it is a
sovereign, independent nation in relationship to the Canadian state." PATHWAYS TO
SELF-DETERMINATION: CANADIAN INDIANS AND THE CANADIAN STATE 174 (Leroy
Little Bear et al. eds., 1984) [hereinafter PATHWAYS]. The Iroquois Confederacy, or the
Haudenosaunee, consists of six individual tribes. The Haudenosaunee "have
consistently held that they have never ceased to be the same Confederacy that stood
equal to France, Britain, and the United States in the 17th and 18th centuries. The claim to such a
status .... is a concept intrinsic to Iroquois identity, tradition, and history." David Schneider & Dr.
Louis Furmansla, The International Personality of Indigenous Peoples An Acountfim North Ameriua
(visited Mar. 26,1997) <http://www.geoties.com/CapitlMl/8366/idiarLhtt>. Also, certain
nations claim that "their forefathers never surrendered their nationhood or right to self-
government, nor was it taken from them by conquest. They claim that these rights
were usurped surreptitiously by successive British and Canadian governments, in
contravention of international law." Leroy Little Bear et al., Introduction to PATHWAYS,
supra, at xv. Members of the Iroquois Confederacy also routinely refuse to be
identified as Canadian citizens and have their own passports.
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government within the Canadian federal system. What is consistent
across First Nations communities in Canada is the demand for a na-
tion-to-nation relationship with Canada,12 but it is precisely this
notion of a nation-to-nation relationship that is problematic and that
is properly a question of international law. International law is a
suitable tool and optic because it is accustomed to radical change
occasioned by historical and practical necessity, specifically with
regard to ways of organizing territory in a manner which is more
fluid than that of the consensually-based internal law. This may
lend itself well to new possibilities.
International law contains the heart of the matter, and therefore
perhaps contains greater possibilities, not only for Canada's First
Nations but for other peoples as well. The heart of the matter is that
First Nations claims for self-government are unacceptable, indeed
12. The particulars and the extent of First Nations' demands for self-government
vary widely from nation to nation because each particular struggle is informed by
different historical and geopolitical factors. First Nations peoples have confronted
Canadian governments both as individual nations and as a united front. Sometimes
First Nations demands have been oppositional and very specific in nature in that they
were catalyzed as protest to a governmental move. Such was the case of the Mohawks
in Qu6bec in 1990, who opposed both the provincial government of Qu6bec and the
Canadian federal government over the proposed use of sacred lands for a golf course.
Other times they have been united in broader claims for self-government, as when the
Assembly of First Nations participated in the constitutional talks leading to the draft-
ing of the Charlottetown Accord (for constitutional amendment). Although the accord
failed in the end, it would have gone a long way toward reconciliation between Can-
ada's First Nations and the Canadian government. Among other things, it would have
recognized First Nations governments as a third order of government in Canada,
alongside the provincial and federal orders of government.
While it is impossible to consider all the various forms of self-government that
have been debated, it is useful to analyze that which First Nations demands have in
common: the claim to a right of self-government defined as a nation-to-nation rela-
tionship with Canada. This type of relationship was embodied in the Charlottetown
Accord, which recognized the inherent (rather than delegated) right of First Nations to
govern themselves as they see fit, without interference, in all aspects of government
(culture, religion, language, education, development, economic activities, law and
legal institutions, housing, health, social services, environment, policing, etc.). It is also
detailed in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights, which has not yet been adopted and which is discussed in
greater detail below. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 (1994) [hereinafter Draft
Declaration] The Draft Declaration recognizes, among other things, the right of in-
digenous peoples to freely determine their relationship with States in a spirit of co-
existence and their right of self-determination, which includes the right to freely de-
termine their political status. Id. at preamble, Art. 3. A nation-to-nation relationship
with Canada does not necessarily imply secession and can refer to First Nations self-
government within the country of Canada. The majority of First Nations self-
government projects seek a form of self-government within Canada. Neither, how-
ever, does a nation-to-nation relationship preclude secession, and the arguments
advanced by this Essay are not intended to defeat any such claim, but rather to define
the grounds upon which it might be argued.
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unthinkable, to current international law. One reason for this is be-
cause the First Nations essentially demand a degree of sovereignty
as a nation rather than as a state, 13 which is the only subject recog-
nized by international law. They are unacceptable to contemporary
states such as Canada, which are subjects of international law, be-
cause the recognition of collective rights on the scale of a nation
would constitute a breach of the sovereign state in question.
The state, as it exists in current international law, is essentially a
Western notion despite its international application, and as such it is
not particularly hospitable either to concepts such as the organiza-
tional models based on the collective traditionally used by many
First Nations or to non-Western concepts in general. It is likely, then,
that the obstacles faced by First Nations in their struggle for self-
determination are faced by non-Western nations of people around
the globe.
Part L.A of this Essay will consider the broader context that sur-
rounds this tension between First Nations' demands for self-
government and the interests of the Canadian state, and which will
prove to be relevant to its possible resolution. Parts I.B-I.D will
identify the nature of First Nations demands, the nature of Canada,
and the aspects of conflict between them. The second section of this
Essay will discuss the problem in the context of a Western legal
tradition considered to be at a critical turning point, that is, at a point
where--though public opinion, as well as certain legal instruments,
13. This distinction between nation and state is discussed in greater detail
elsewhere. See discussion infra Part I.C. It should be noted that although a defined
territory is one of several characteristics of statehood, an attachment to certain lands
may or may not also be a characteristic of nationhood. A claim to sovereignty as a nation,
then, does not preclude a claim to territory. The Fourth World Documentation Project of the
Center for World Indigenous Studies defines a nation as a "self-identifying people who
share a common history, often language, a common culture and a homeland." Center for
World Indigenous Studies, FWDP-Defition of Nation (visited April 2, 1997)
<http://www.halcyon.com/FWDP/nationhtdm> [hereinafter Definition of Nation]. On the
other hand, a state is defined as a "territory built by conquest in which one culture, one set of
ideals and one set of laws have been imposed by force or threat over diverse nations."
Center for World Indigenous Studies, FWDP--Definition of State (visited April 2, 1997)
<http://www.halcyon.com/FWDP/state.html> [hereinafter Definition of State]. While
nations are "the most persistent and resistant organization of people-culture," Definition of
Nation, supra, "[sitates are ephemeral and originate and disappear with the stroke of a pen,"
Definition of State, supra. My own definition is as follows:
Nation is defined as a community of people, usually but not necessarily in-
stalled on a given territory, and which, due to a certain unity, be it historical,
linguistic, religious, racial or other, is animated by the desire to live together. It
is self-conscious. It voluntarily defines itself as nation. And although it will
have some form of political organization or political entity, it may or may not
dispose of a state.
SUZAN DIONNE BALz, THE CONSTITUTION OF A NATION 1 (1993) (on file with the
author).
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accepts the justice of observing the collective right of peoples to self-
determination-our legal system seems to be structurally incapable
of doing so in this case. This Part of the Essay will also discuss some
areas of international law that may offer some possibilities for re-
form.
I. THE CONTEXT AND THE CONFLICT
A. Historical Context
The recent proliferation of articles and books in support of First
Nations demands for self-determination indicates that a large part of
public opinion considers these demands just.4 Recent Canadian ju-
risprudence, such as Calder v. Attorney-General of B.C." and Guerin v.
The Queen,6 indicates that the judiciary now also considers that some
sort of equitable resolution to the historical wrongs perpetuated by
Canada against its First Nations must either be discovered or in-
vented. Patrick Macklem describes the dissent in Calder as:
a powerful dissent, concurred in by Spencer and Laskin JJ.,
in which [Justice Hall] argued that Nishga title was not
extinguished by colonial proclamations and legislative en-
actments. Reacting against .the tenor of historical
documentation which imagined native people to be "in ef-
fect a subhuman species," Justice Hall sought to expand
the nature of the Indian proprietary interests within the
confines established by St. Catherine's Milling and the Mar-
shall trilogy. Rather than claiming the source of the native
14. In addition to the authors cited in this Essay, see FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE
INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST (1975);
RlMl SAVARD & JEAN-RENt PROULX CANADA: DERRItRE L'POPtE, LES AUTOCHTONES
(1982); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
15. Calder v. Attorney-General of B.C. [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.). The Calder opinion
established the survival of aboriginal rights with respect to land. The Court held that
the Nishga peoples possessed aboriginal rights to their lands that had survived Euro-
pean settlement. The Court was divided, however, on the question of whether or not
the rights had been validly extinguished. The recognition of this right was nonetheless
significant enough for the federal government to begin treaty negotiations concerning
regions of Canada not yet subject to treaties. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA §27.5(b) (3rd ed. 1992) (discussing the recognition of aboriginal
rights in the Calder opinion).
16. Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.). The Guerin opinion concerned
land surrendered to the Crown by the Musqueam Indian Band so that it could be
leased by the Crown to a golf club, and which the Crown leased on terms less favor-
able than those stipulated by the Band. The Court recognized the Band's aboriginal
title to the lands, which it described as "a legal right derived from the Indians' historic
occupation and possession of their tribal lands." Id. at 376.
[VOL. 2:537
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interest to be the Royal Proclamation, . . . Hall J. rooted the
native interest in the common law of property and invoked
the common law principle that "[?V]ossession is of itself at
common law proof of ownership."'
In Guerin, considered to be a landmark case, the Supreme Court
of Canada affirmed that the Crown had a fiduciary obligation to-
wards the Musqueam Indian Band and established that this
fiduciary obligation is governed by the principle of equity, which is
subject to judicial review.'
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982 recognizes and af-
firms "[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada."' 9 However, these recent developments reflect a
radical change in perspective with respect to First Nations' rights.
Canada's colonial and imperialist history and origins dispossessed
First Nations peoples of their land and, to some extent, of their cul-
ture because European interests did not consider them to be
civilized human beings equal to themselves and having the right to
equal respect. A papal bull of 1537, the Sublimis Deus of Paul III,
affirmed that "the right of discovery could not be invoked in cases
where the lands in question were already inhabited., 20 The categori-
zation of the people then inhabiting North America as uncivilized
groups who did not farm the land but roamed it "erratically" in
search of game and fish, allowed the Europeans to convince them-
selves that the lands were not "really" inhabited and were therefore
appropriable by the "discoverer. ' 2 ' This perspective is now disa-
17. Patrick Macklem, First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian
Legal Imagination, 2 MCGILL L.J. 382, 409 (1991) (quoting Calder 11973] S.C.R. at 368
(Hall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)).
18. Guerin [1984] 2 S.C.RI at 348-53.
19. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. II (Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of
Canada), §35(1).
20. SAVARD & PROULX, supra note 14, at 20 (translation mine) (quoting the Sublirnis
Deus of Paul III). Theologians in Europe, such as Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546),
were some of the first scholars to explore the legal relationship between First Nations
and the European colonists. See Schneider & Furmanski, supra note 11.
21. SAVARD & PROULX, supra note 14, at 26. The theologian Francisco de Vitoria
eventually justified European conquest of North America as follows: "Although these
barbarians are not altogether mad... they are not far from being so .... They are not,
or are no longer, capable of governing themselves any more than madmen or even
wild beasts and animals .... " Schneider & Furmanski, supra note 11, at 3. Henry J.
Steiner and Philip Aiston note:
During and following the period of colonization of the Americas, international
law justified in many respects the conduct (civilizing mission) of the European
states, effectively legitimating colonization and subjugation while demeaning
the culture, religious beliefs and achievements of the conquered or hostile na-
tive peoples. Civilization and Christianity stood against paganism and
barbarism. Although these beliefs and doctrines were moderated, indigenous
SPRING 19971
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vowed and has been replaced by an internationalized concept of
individual human rights that theoretically applies to all, without ex-
ception.
An important catalyst to this change of opinion is found in the
first half of this century, at a time of industrial, trade, and communi-
cations expansion that brought the European states, in their
expanded colonial forms, into closer contact, and during which two
world wars were fought. The post-war world was a very different
one. The international society of states remained very politically and
economically interrelated and interdependent as a result of, among
other things, rapidly increasing international trade. This was even
more the case for the European and North American community of
states, which were necessarily united in the Cold War. Moreover,
because this community recognized its capacity for global war; it
took steps to assure international peace and security, as well as the
preferred balance of power, via international organizations and
treaties. The Charter of the United Nations, adopted in 1945 at the
close of World War II, states:
We [t]he [p]eoples of [t]he United Nations [d]etermined to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small ... [a]nd for [t]hese [e]nds . . . to unite our
strength to maintain international peace and security .... 22
Article 1 of the U.N. Charter lists the United Nations' objectives,
which include "achiev[ing] international co-operation.., in promot-
ing and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all,"23 and "[tlo be a centre for harmonizing the actions
of nations in the attainment of these common ends. 2 The U.N.
Charter's strategy for the maintenance of international peace is the
international privileging and protection of fundamental and indi-
vidual human rights. While the advent of individual human rights
constituted a certain breach of the sovereignty of states by subjecting
them to the surveillance of international organizations, it is arguable
peoples did not start to become a significant protected category under interna-
tional law until the start of the human rights movement.
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1007 (1996).
22. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
23. Id. at art. 1, para. 3.
24. Id. at art. 1, para. 4.
[VOL. 2:537
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that this strategy of focusing on individual rights was acceptable to
the member states because it only obliquely affects their sovereignty.
In 1948, shortly after the adoption of the Charter, the U.N.
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,25 which pre-
cipitated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights26
and the two Optional Protocols to that Covenant.27 Professors of in-
ternational law Jacques-Yvan Morin, Francis Rigaldies, and Daniel
Turp have this to say of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
"The normative explosion in the domain of human rights can be at-
tributed to the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights], which
constituted the first attempt to enumerate and to formulate funda-
mental human rights in terms universally acceptable., 28
International instruments also eventually recognized certain
limited collective rights and a limited right of peoples to self-
determination.2 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
27. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty,
July 11, 1991, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49, U.N.
Doc. A/44/49. See JACQUES-YVAN MORIN ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC:
NOTES ET DOCUMENTS 489 (1987) (discussing the international recognition of human
rights through adoption of these covenants).
28. Id. (translation mine). Hurst Hannum notes:
The "principle" of self-determination is mentioned only twice in the 1945
Charter of the United Nations, both times in the limiting context of developing
"friendly relations among nations" and in conjunction with the principle of
"equal rights ... of peoples."
Neither self-determination nor minority rights is mentioned in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although the Declaration does contain
a preambular reference to developing amicable international relations. What-
ever its political significance, the principle of self-determination had not
attained the status of a rule of international law by the time of the drafting of
the United Nations Charter or in the early United Nations era.
Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-12 (1993).
29. The United Nations' 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples affirms that "[all peoples have the right to self-
determination [and that] by virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/L.323 and Add. 1-
6 [hereinafter Declaration on Colonial Independence]. The Declaration on Colonial
Independence, however, limits this right to self-determination by stating that "[any
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations." Id. at para. 6. The Declaration on Colonial Independence also
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Rights ("ICCPR") was one of the first international instruments to
affirm not only the right of self-determination of peoples, but also
certain collective rights of minorities. While recognizing equal hu-
man rights for all persons in its preamble, it also affirms that:
All peoples have the rights of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall
gave rise to uncertainties regarding the meaning of terms such as "people,"
"territories," and "countries."
The later Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations], addressed some
of these uncertainties. Hannurn, supra note 28, at 13-14. The Declaration on Friendly
Relations affirmed the right of peoples to freely determine their political status with-
out external interference and it recognized that "[tihe establishment of a sovereign and
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right to self-determination by that people." Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra, at 124. However, the Declaration on Friendly Relations does
not offer a definition of the term "peoples" and it also contains a limitation on the right
to self-determination when it states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair... the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a govern-
ment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour.
All States enjoy sovereign equality .... [which provides that] territorial
integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable [and that] [ejach
State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic
and cultural systems ....
Id. In order to be "in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples" and thus to benefit from the limit on self-determination, a
state probably need only "represent 'the whole people.' " Hannum, supra note 28, at 17
(quoting Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, at 124). In other words, a state will
be representative insofar as it does not formally exclude a particular group from par-
ticipation in the political process on the basis of that group's race, creed or color. Id. In
practical terms, then, insofar as the state does not formally exclude participation by
First Nations peoples in its democratic political processes, it may profit from the limi-
tation on self-determination and is thus entitled to its territorial integrity and political
independence. The relationship between the state and its First Nations would there-
fore remain more or less a matter of domestic law.
[VOL. 2:537
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not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to pro-
fess and 9ractise their own religion, or to use their own
language.
Thus, the post-war period saw a flurry of activity seeking inter-
national consensus on human rights issues. These international
instruments indicated a significant change in concepts of justice
taking place, not only in their recognition of individual human rights
to all without exception (as opposed to the colonialist position that
"uncivilized" nations such as the peoples of the Americas were too
inhuman to invoke, for example, the "already occupied" obstacle to
the "right of discovery" principle31), but also in their attempts to
formulate the necessarily collective right of self-determination of
minorities and peoples within the territory of a sovereign state.
While a certain consensus regarding individual human rights
was possible, however, the question of a collective right of self-
determination remained problematic. It has been argued, for exam-
ple, that the ICCPR gives entirely discrete rights to minorities on the
one hand (such as cultural, linguistic, and religious rights) and to
peoples on the other (such as the right of self-determination). Moreo-
ver, because "minorities" are not "peoples" they are not entitled to
the right of self-determination; that right properly belongs to peoples
in the sense of the peoples of a state in their entirety. Furthermore,
the ICCPR protects persons belonging to minorities rather than minori-
ties themselves, thus suggesting that even the rights ascribed to
minorities are not so much collective as individual rights, 3 and that
these rights shall not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of a state.' These same problems were also present in the
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992,3 which affirmed the
right of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture,
30. ICCPR, supra note 26, at arts. 1, 27.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
32. See Rosalyn Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, Comments,
in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 32 (Catherine Br6lmann et al.
eds., 1993).
33. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 21, at 992.
34. General Comment No. 23 on Article 27 of the Covenant, para. 3.2, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Committee on Human Rights,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 5 (Apr. 24, 1994) (cited in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 21,
at 992).
35. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/47/135 (1992) [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights of Minorities]; see
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 21, at 987.
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religion, and language,36 except insofar as specific practices were in
violation of national law and contrary to international standards,37
and which affirmed that these rights may be exercised individually
as well as in community.3 Again, self-determination rights are lim-
ited by an affirmation of the sovereign equality, territorial integrity,
and political independence of states.
Given this tendency to restrict human rights to individual
rights overseen by the unchallenged sovereign state,40 First Nations
peoples have consistently lobbied for a status in international law
distinct from that of either individuals or minorities.4' They have
36. Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 35, at art. 2.
37. Id. at art. 4.
38. Id. at art. 3.
39. Id. at art. 8.
40. Miguiel Martinez, Special Rapporteur to the U.N., criticizes the
ICCPR, the Optional Protocols, and the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities
because:
the rights they acknowledge and the protection they accord are, in the strict
sense, applicable only to members of such groups as individuals, not to the
group as such and considered in its entirety... despite ... certain references to
minorities as entities considered as a whole.
In other words, the prevalent notion in those texts is one of individual
rights as the focus for possible international concern over human rights, as has
been fashionable in the United Nations since the groundwork was laid down in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MI-
NORITIES, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: STUDY ON TREATIES,
AGREEMENTS AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN STATES AND
INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS: SECOND PROGRESS REPORT SUBMITTED BY MR MIGUIEL
ALFONSO MARTINEZ, SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, U.N. Doc. E/GN.4/Sub.2/1995/27 at
paras. 78-79 (1995).
Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston remark that most rights in the human rights
instruments have an individual character, even though many of them are at the same
time germane to the formation of groups, such as the right of association. STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note 21, at 993. They also note that the nature of a right to an autonomy
regime would then have a markedly different character even from individual rights
that have some collective or group association, since "[alutonomy rights are unmis-
takably collective in the sense that they can be exercised only by the group-by its
spokespersons or representatives, however they are selected--and cannot be reduced
to or expressed through the rights of its members." Id.
41. Stephen Marquardt notes:
Many minorities are to greater or lesser degrees integrated into the
population of the State in which they live and do not object to being treated as
national citizens. As reflected in the rights protected under the [Declaration on
the Rights of Minorities], minorities often seek only to practice their own relig-
ion, language, or culture....
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sought to establish that they are "members of the international
community who have a legal personality under international
law--subjects of international legal rights and duties rather than
mere objects of international concern."' 2 To these ends, both the Con-
vention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries of the International Labour Organization, which became
effective in 1991, and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples," still under discussion, specifically concern
indigenous peoples. The ILO Convention protects indigenous lan-
guages, religions, cultures and values45 in so far as they are not
incompatible with the legal system of the state or with international
law." It uses the term peoples, but affirms that its use "shall not be
construed as having any implication as regards the rights which
may attach to the term under international law. '' 7 The ILO Conven-
tion imposes very few obligations on governments, such as an
obligation to consult indigenous peoples regarding governmental
measures that may affect them. It does not guarantee any particular
481form of participation and it gives no effective rights of autonomy.
The Draft Declaration, on the other hand, if adopted, will recognize
the inherent rights of indigenous peoples, 9 their right to freely de-
from minorities is their ancestral, "pre-colonial" link to the territory, which is
not the case for most minorities. Furthermore, indigenous peoples in most
cases seek some form of political autonomy on the ground of their separate
identity.... Most Indian and Inuit peoples also categorically reject classifica-
tion as Canadian or US citizens and claim their own nationality.
Stephen Marquardt, International Law and Indigenous Peoples, 3 INT'L J. GROUP RTS. 47,
70 (1995).
42. Russel Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of Interna-
tional Law?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 35 (1994) (emphasis added).
43. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries, ILO Convention No. 169 (June 27, 1989) [hereinafter ILO Convention]; see
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 21, at 1008.
44. Draft Declaration, supra note 12.
45. ILO Convention, supra note 43, at preamble, arts. 4, 5.
46. Id. at art. 8.
47. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 21, at 1008 (citing ILO Convention, supra note 43,
at art. 1). Note that under international law, peoples have a right to self-determination
recognized by instruments such as the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 26, at art. 1.
48. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 21, at 1008. The Canadian government, for ex-
ample, in the guise of consulting First Nations peoples regarding governmental
measures that may affect them, "customarily will mail letters to the chiefs, notifying
them of new administrative or legislative changes, often without allowing them
enough time to conduct an appropriate and thorough analysis of these changes. If the
chiefs do not answer these letters within a certain limit, the government proceeds.
When we complain about these changes, we are told that the letter itself was the only
form of consultation." Sharon Venne, The New language of Assimilatiow A Brief Analy-
sis of ILO Convention 169, in 2 WITHOUT PREJUDICE: THE EAFORD INT'L REV. OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION 58 (1989)
49. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at preamble.
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termine their relationship with States in a spirit of coexistence, mu-
tual benefit and full respect,50 their right to freely determine their
political status,"1 and that governments must obtain their consent
before enacting measures that may affect them.52 It also foresees that,
as a specific form of exercise of their right to self-determination, in-
digenous peoples have a right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture,
religion, education, information, media, health, housing, employ-
ment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resources
management, environment and entry by non-members, as well as
ways and means for financing these autonomous functions. The
final version of the Draft Declaration is, however, a long ways off,
and state governments, including the Canadian government, have
expressed their reluctance to apply the international meaning of the
words self-determination, self-government, territory, and peoples to in-
digenous peoples, preferring that 5uestions concerning indigenous
peoples remain a domestic issue. It would seem, then, that the
construction of a group of international instruments which newly
expanded the principles of equal individual human rights
(including certain rights of persons belonging to minorities) to an
international level was possible because the international commu-
nity of states considers that the surveillance of the rights of isolated
individuals within their boundaries by international organizations
such as the United Nations does not constitute a dangerous breach
of their sovereignty, as might international recognition of a people's
right of self-government. s
With this nonetheless newly expanded notion of justice, then,
we have a wretched history to redress. In pursuit of this objective,
we must now identify the nature of First Nations demands, we must
identify Canada, and we must identify the conflicts between them.
B. Identifying First Nations' Self-Government
Canada's First Nations' demands for self-government are
foremost demands for self-determination and a nation-to-nation re-
50. Id.
51. Id. at art. 3.
52. Id. at art. 20.
53. Id. at art. 31.
54. Rudolph C. Ryser, Indian Nations and United States Debate Self-Determination and Self-
Government at the United Nations (visited Mar. 26, 1997)
http://www.halcyoncom/pub/FWDP/Intenational/unwgip93.tx>.
55. The use of the term "peoples" here is synonymous with "nation," see discussion
supra note 13, as opposed to Rosalyn Higgins' sense of the term as being synonymous
with "the peoples of a state in their entirety," see supra text accompanying note 32.
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lationship with Canada. Although there are differing opinions about
which form this could take, 5 it seems that what is sought is a dis-
tinctly non-Western model of organization which operates in
accordance with traditional principles. One such traditional princi-
ple which will prove to be extremely difficult to accommodate, is
that of the privileging of the collective over the individual. This em-
phasis on the collective rather than the individual is evident in the
consensual system of organization, as well as in the First Nations
concept of ownership and property. In discussing these ambitions,
the words of First Nations peoples themselves will be used as much
as possible, as would seem to be appropriate.
Traditional Indian government, according to Marie Smallface
Marule, is "of the people, by the people, for thesXeople.' 5 7 According
to her, emphasis is placed on the collective will. Menno Boldt and J.
Anthony Long state:
in Indian tribal society individual self-interest was inextri-
cably intertwined with tribal interests; that is, the general
good and the individual good were virtually identical....
Indians traditionally defined themselves communally,
based on a spiritual compact rather than a social contract.
The tribal will constituted a vital spiritual principle which
for most tribes gained expression in sharing and co-
operation rather than private property and competitionis9
The 1876 Indian Act,60 for example, met with broad resistance
against the obvious intent to assimilate via, among other things,
provisions that deliberately encouraged individual property rights
on reserves. 6' Leroy Little Bear submits that:
Indian ownership of property, like Indians' way of relating
to the world, is holistic. Land is communally owned; own-
ership rests not in any one individual, but rather belongs to
the tribe as a whole, as an entity. The members of a tribe
have an undivided interest in the land; everybody, as a
whole, owns the whole. Furthermore, the land belongs not
56. See discussion supra note 12.
57. Marie Smallface Marule, Traditional Indian Government: Of the People, by the
People, for the People, in PATHWAYS, supra note 11, at 36, 36.
58. Id.
59. Menno Boldt & J. Anthony Long, Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political
Ideologies: The Dilemma of Canada's Native Indians, in THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: ABO-
RIGINAL PEOPLES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 333, 336 (Menno Boldt & J. Anthony Long
eds., 1985).
60. The Indian Act, 1876, ch. 18, S.C. 1876 (Can.).
61. Little Bear et al., supra note 11, at xii.
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only to people presently living, but also to past generations
and future generations .... In addition, the land belongs
not only to human beings, but also to other living things
(the plants and animals and sometimes even the rocks);
they, too, have an interest.
62
Within this perspective, though, "there still prevailed a respect for
individual autonomy and freedom.. . probably best exemplified by
the absence in traditional Indian political thought of hierarchical
authority .... Respect for the individual also found expression in
decision-making by consensus."' The elective system provisioned in
the 1876 Indian Act was another ground of resistance, because of its
hierarchical authority structure and majority rule which encouraged
factionalism." "As soon as you begin to short-cut, you begin to de-
tract from the complete thought and the process for its achievement.
This process works through discussion until consensus is reached..
. ."6 This way of thinking about the collective and the individual's
place within it, and about the collective in relation to its larger envi-
ronment as is seen in the concept of ownership, is part of a
cosmogony common to many First Nations, where "all life is con-
sidered equal, [and therefore] we are no more or no less than
anything else."6
C. Identifying Canada
Canada is not something that is usually considered in need of
identification. For the purposes of this Essay, however, it is worth-
while to remark that it is a state, subject of international law. In
international law, a state exists "when a community acquires, with a
reasonable probability of permanence, the essential characteristics of
a state, namely an organized government, a defined territory, and
such a degree of independence of control by any other state as to be
capable of conducting its own international relations., 67 A corner-
stone of the state in current international law is the concept of
62. Macklen, supra note 17, at 396 (quoting Leroy Little Bear, Aboriginal Rights and
the Canadian "Grundnorm," in ARDUOUS JOURNEY: CANADIAN INDIANS AND DE-
COLONIZATION 243, 245 (1986)).
63. Little Bear et al, Introduction to Chapter One, Cultural and Ideological Foundations,
in PATHWAYS, supra note 11, at 3.
64. Little Bear et al., Introduction to PATHWAYS, supra note 11, at xii.
65. Oren Lyons, Spirituality, Equality and Natural Law, in PATHWAYS, supra note 11,
at5, 5.
66. Id. at 6.
67. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 137 (1963).
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sovereignty. One of the first formulations of sovereignty was by
Bodin, who thought that:
a confusion of uncoordinated independent authorities
must be fatal to a state, and that there must be one final
source and not more than one from which its laws pro-
ceed. The essential manifestation of sovereignty ... is the
power to make the laws . . . , and since the sovereign
makes the laws, he clearly cannot be bound by the laws
that he makes ....
Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long further elucidate the concept:
Bodin and Hobbes wrote of sovereignty as if it were
equivalent to absolute and perpetual authority derived
from either God or the people. For Locke and Rousseau
sovereignty arose from absolute authority derived from the
voluntary agreement of independent wills (contract of as-
sociation) delegating their authority to the government, the
fiduciary sovereign. Common to both of these conceptions
of sovereignty, and generally implied in all European-
western concepts of sovereignty, is a principle of authority
defined as the supreme, if not the absolute and inalienable,
power of the ruling entity to make decisions and to enforce
them, if necessary, through sanctions or coercion. Invaria-
bly linked with this principle of authority is the idea of
hierarchy of power relationships. 69
This sovereign authority has two main objects: its territory and
its population. Brierly describes territorial sovereignty as:
bear[ing] an obvious resemblance to ownership in private
law, less marked, however, today than it was in the days of
the patrimonial state, when a kingdom and everything in it
was regarded as being to the king very much what a
landed estate was to its owner. As a result of this resem-
blance early international law borrowed the Roman rules
for the acquisition of property and adapted them to the ac-
quisition of territory, and these rules are still the
foundation of the law on the subject."
For example, the assumption of Crown title over all Canadian lands
is the foundation of Canadian property law. The assumption of
68. Id. at 8-9.
69. Boldt & Long, supra note 59, at 335.
70. BRIERLY, supra note 67, at 162.
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Crown title is based upon the idea that all lands belong to some ti-
tleholder, that such a title is by definition absolute and that "lain
absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in different per-
sons, or in different governments. 71 In Johnson v. M 'Intosh,72 to use
Patrick Macklem's precis, the international law doctrine of discovery
and the concept of Crown prerogative were used to support the
conclusion that underlying title vests with the state and that the na-
tive interest in the land is one of occupancy only.73
The exercise of this sovereign authority over a population is not
clearly distinguishable from its territorial pretensions.
Modern states are territorial; their governments exercise
control over persons and things within their frontiers, and
today the whole of the habitable world is divided between
about a hundred of these territorial states.
At the basis of international law lies the notion that a
state occupies a definite part of the surface of the earth,
within which it normally exercises . ... jurisdiction over
persons and things to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of
other states. When a state exercises an authority of this
kind ... it is popularly said to have "sovereignty" over the
territory.74
The state maintains its sovereign authority over its population by
objectifying them as property that is territorially bounded and by
simultaneously treating them as a mass of so many isolated indi-
viduals whose only unity resides with the state. More specifically:
All persons have equal rights in law as individuals, and
their membership in one or another racial or political
group is irrelevant to their voting rights, civil rights, and
eligibility to receive government benefits, services, and
protections. Group rights per se do not exist. For example,
French Canadians do not have special linguistic rights in
Canada; rather, every Canadian has the right to practise
the official language of his or her choice. The very concept
71. Macklern, supra note 17, at 402 (quoting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 588 (1823)).
72. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
73. Macklem, supra note 17, at 398.
74. BRIERLY, supra note 67, at 126, 162.
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of special rights for one or another racial or political group
is abhorrent to the small-I liberal ideology ....
The Canadian state, then, is an absolute and territorial authority
which considers itself as having title to all things falling within its
territory, including its population, whose only group allegiance can
be to the state.
D. Borders in Conflict
There are at least two fundamental conflicts between these two
perspectives: the privileging of the collective versus the privileging
of the individual, and their very different notions of territory. These
two conflicts are not unrelated, however, and they can both be at
least partially attributed to the fact that Canada is a state in the sense
of current international law, while First Nations are not. The doc-
trine of sovereignty as it currently exists in international law is
fundamentally irreconcilable with some of the First Nations' most
cherished principles:
The European-western notion of a sovereign authority has
its origin in the system of feudalism and the associated be-
lief in the inherent inequality of men. The indigenous
peoples of North America, however, never experienced
feudalism, and most believed in the equality of men. In the
Hobbesian doctrine of sovereignty, authority was deemed
necessary to protect society against rampant individual
self-interest."
If, however, First Nations self-interests are indivisible by definition,
then they should have no need of this protection." It follows that
they also have no need of and reject the imposed structure of hierar-
chical political authority which the state represents, since traditional
principles reject the "separation of authority from the community."7 8
75. J. Rick Ponting & Roger Gibbins, Thorns in the Bed of Roses: A Socio-Political View
of the Problems of Indian Government, in PATHWAYS, supra note 11, at 122, 133.
76. Boldt & Long, supra note 59, at 336.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59, 62.
78. Boldt & Long, supra note 59, at 340. It is important to forestall romanticized
impressions of an idyllic and unified body politic. It is not the intention of this Essay to
portray First Nations communities as communities without internal political strife or
conflicts and challenges of authority, but rather as communities in which authority is
defined differently and whose internal disputes and the means of resolving them will
likewise be different. For example, in some First Nations communities there are con-
flicts of legitimacy between elected members of the band council (a system instituted
by The Indian Act, 1876, ch. 18, S.C. 1876 (Can.), which prohibited traditional forms of
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In Europe, even after the Enlightenment era, it was not
authority per se that came under question, but rather who
should exercise authority. New, more humane arrange-
ments for exercising authority were devised, including
election and delegation. Most Indian tribes, however, did
not accept that any man or agency had the inherent or
transferred right to govern others, even in the service of the
tribal good. The people ruled collectively, exercising
authority as one body with undivided power, performing
all functions of government. The tribe was not the result of
a contract among individuals or between ruler(s) and
ruled, but of a divine creation. No human being was
deemed to have control over the life of another. Therefore,
the authority to rule could not be delegated to any one
member or subset of members of the tribal group. This
denial of personal authority extended even to the notion of
transferring the right to govern within specified fixed lim-
its. Any arrangement that would separate the people from
their fundamental, natural, and inalienable right to govern
themselves directly was deemed illegitimate.
The political and social experiences and history "that would allow
Indians to conceive of authority in European-western terms simply
did not exist, nor can sovereign authority be reconciled with the
traditional beliefs and values that they want to retain."0 Prior to
colonization, First Nations operated as independent, stateless na-
tions not having a derived, delegated, or transferred right, but one
that came into existence with the group itself."'
If authority is located in the community, then there can be no
state. Under international law, however, "[tihe basic unit... is not
government) and the traditional leaders. Such communities are of divided allegiances.
See discussion supra note 2; supra text accompanying note 64.
Another such example is Native Women's Ass'n of Can. v. Canada [1994] 3
S.C.R 627 (Can.). In this case, the Native Women's Association of Canada (NWA)
claimed, among other things, that by funding the participation of four male-dominated
First Nations groups in the constitutional conferences leading up to the Charlottetown
Accord and by excluding the NWA from direct funding for such participation, the fed-
eral government infringed upon their freedom of expression. The NWA felt that the
position of these First Nations groups in the constitutional talks might not be as pro-
Charter as their own. The NWA wanted the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms) to be made applicable to any form of First Nations self-government that
might be negotiated at these talks so as to preserve the constitutional protection of
their equality rights. The Supreme Court held that there was no infringement of their
freedom of expression.
79. Boldt & Long, supra note 59, at 337.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 340.
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the nation but the state."82 It then becomes apparent that an essential
obstacle to Canada and the First Nations coming to an equitable so-
lution is that First Nations demands are profoundly unacceptable
not only to Canada, but to the wider context which defines Canada,
that is, to international law.
International law, despite its appellation, is essentially a West-
ern concept. "[I]nternational law is modern, dating only from the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for its special character has
been determined by that of the modern European state system,
which was itself shaped in the ferment of the Renaissance and the
Reformation."83 The modern state system developed by defeating all
other contesting forms of authority, such as feudal loyalties and the
authority of the church.8 The state "declared the determination of
the civil authority to be supreme in its own territory.""" This new
organization brought an end to the unity that had existed among
states by virtue of a common Christianity." Machiavelli's Prince de-
scribed a "conception of the state as an entity entirely self-sufficing
and non-moral.' s However, other factors such as expanded com-
merce and the common intellectual background fostered by the
Renaissance, brought the European states "into more intimate and
constant relations with one another:"'
All these causes co-operated to make it certain that.., in
the modern world as in the medieval world it would be
necessary to recognize the existence of a wider unity. The
rise of international law was the recognition of this truth. It
accepted the abandonment of the medieval ideal of a
world-state and took instead as its fundamental postulate
the existence of a number of states, secular, national, and
territorial .. 89
It was from this new kind of European state that the doctrine of sov-
ereignty developed as a new theory of the nature of states.90 This
doctrine reached its modern form in the nineteenth century, when
the state "gave expression in theory to the growing strength and ex-
clusiveness of the sentiment of nationality during the nineteenth
82. John D. Whyte, Indian Self-Government: A Legal Analysis, in PATHWAYS, supra
note 11, at 101, 103.
83. BRIERLY, supra note 67, at 1.
84. Id. at 3-4.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 6-7.
90. Id. at 7.
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the state "gave expression in theory to the growing strength and ex-
clusiveness of the sentiment of nationality during the nineteenth
century. 91 The nationalism of the European states in the pre-war era
was the foundation of the doctrine of sovereignty as absolute and
impersonal authority vested in the person of the state and it is a cor-
nerstone concept in international law. Indeed, international law
developed as a necessary response to the problem of this concept of
sovereignty in situations where events were necessitating a certain
amount of cooperation between states.9 And yet the doctrine of sov-
ereignty is a Western concept. The system of international law
eventually expanded, especially in the post-World War era, beyond
the European states, and now it is a world-wide system that governs
nations which had no part in its construction. More importantly, de-
spite its territorial expansion to an international scope, the doctrine
of sovereignty remains fundamentally a Western concept. Interna-
tional rules relating to territory are still in essence the Roman rules
of property, and rights over territory resemble the individual owner-
ship of property.93 Furthermore, the post-war adoption of
international instruments regarding individual human rights is also
the expansion of fundamentally Western concepts.
II. THE RECONCILIATION
The search for solutions or alternatives takes place in the con-
text of a Western legal tradition that is at a critical point in its
history, where it must either rise to the challenge or be radically re-
formed. The arrival of this critical point is apparent in that both
public and judicial opinions generally accept the validity of First
Nations' claims for redress of Canada's colonial past and, to a cer-
tain extent, for their right to self-determination. 94 This crisis is also
apparent in the recent rise of demands for the right to self-
determination by many peoples--in addition to the First Na-
91. Id. at 15-16.
92. Christian Tomuschat remarks that:
international law, although requiring compliance by States which are its main
addressees, is a creation by those same States which, through its rules, seek to
guarantee stability in their mutual relations. If on the contrary international
law should aspire critically to assess the raison d tre of States, including judg-
ments to the effect that a State must disintegrate, it would become an
instrument of revolutionary change, almost the opposite of a legal rule.
Christian Tomuschat, Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World, in MODERN LAW OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 4 (Christian Tomuschat ed.,1993).
93. BRIERLY, supra note 67, at 20.
94. See Guerin v. The Queen [19841 2 S.C.RI 335 (Can.); Calder v. Attorney-General
of B.C. [1973] S.C.R.313 (Can.); see also discussion supra Part I.A.
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the organization of the state within whose territory they happen to
fall.
Consistent with that position, public opinion now rejects West-
ern colonialism and is becoming aware of the need for international
cooperation in order to solve new problems of global scale, such as
controlling pollution and the sustainable management of resources.
Although the post-war efforts towards international cooperation
have been characterized as a new form of Western colonialism, it
may also be that it is extremely difficult to think beyond one's own
cultural paradigms. Nonetheless, our legal system, the system of
rendering justice that we have developed, appears to be structurally
incapable of rendering justice as we now conceive of it-and therein
lies its crisis.
A basic principle of international law is the concept of sover-
eignty, yet the concept of sovereignty developed out of European
nationalism. It may not be particularly relevant elsewhere, such as in
other parts of the world or to non-Western concepts of organization.
Neither is it particularly relevant to an era of necessary international
cooperation. The doctrine of sovereignty stands as an obstacle to the
self-determination of non-Western peoples such as the First Nations
because it requires the people within the territory of the state to have
no allegiance apart from the state, with the state being the source of
absolute authority and of absolute definition. Consequently, it treats
its population as discrete individuals rather than as collective enti-
ties. It is true that in recent times, states such as Canada have been
trying to grapple with the organized recognition of certain collective
rights within and under the jurisdiction of their sovereignty, such as
the rights of individuals who are members of minorities; neverthe-
less, these states still refuse to allow collective self-determination in
any substantial way. Even the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples,95 should it be adopted in its present form, is far
from the recognition of a right of self-government for stateless na-
tions. For example, First Nations groups are concerned that Article
31 of the Draft Declaration, detailing specific rights of self-
government over local and internal matters, could prove to be too
limiting.96 Furthermore, the Draft Declaration contains limits on the
right of self-determination. It states that indigenous peoples have the
right to maintain their institutional structures and their juridical
traditions and practices, in accordance with internationally recog-
nized human rights standards.97 It further states that "[n]othing in
95. Draft Declaration, supra note 12.
96. Statement by the Confederacy of Treaty Six First Nations (visited Mar. 26, 1997)
<http://www.halcyon.com/pub/FWDP/Americas/treaty6.txt>; see also discussion
supra Part IA.
97. Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 33.
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this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group
or person any right to engage in any activities or to perform any act
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations." 98 The Charter of the
United Nations, in turn, affirms the sovereign equality of all its
Members and provides that all Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.'
These problems are the result of an inherent contradiction that
underpins the Draft Declaration and other international instruments
of its kind: that the state cannot recognize a large-scale and stateless
collective right to self-determination. The state cannot recognize
First Nations as nations (or peoples), although that is what they are,
because to do so would constitute a very grave breach of territorial
sovereignty. Insofar as the doctrine of sovereignty precludes the rec-
ognition of non-Western forms of collective organization--that is,
forms other than the state--its international application is a form of
colonialism; it thus obstructs the advent of real international coop-
eration to replace Western colonialism. Furthermore, the doctrine of
territorial sovereignty is antithetical to international cooperation in
that it considers the state, as defined by its frontiers, to be utterly
separate and responsible to none and as tolerating, in theory, no in-
terference.
It is, however, precisely this doctrine of sovereignty that holds
some possibility for a Western legal tradition in need of adaptation.
The doctrine of sovereignty, developed as a logical extension of
European nineteenth-century nationalism, has created a fundamen-
tal problem of international law. Because there is no authority higher
than that of the state, international law is necessarily consensual and
without sanction, not unlike the First Nations traditions of political
organization, which operate on the principle of undivided collective
self-interest. 0
A part of the crisis currently faced by the Western legal tradi-
tion is the result of the growing realization in the Western world, as
well as elsewhere, of the need to find global solutions to new global
problems. To this end, international accords such as the Convention
on International Civil Aviation (1944),01 the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
98. Id. at art. 45.
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1, 4.
100. See discussion supra Part I.B.
101. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.
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(1967), 1°2 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(1982),l" and The Antarctic Treaty (1959)"° have been created. All of
these are distinctly territorial in preoccupation and represent fairly
radical reconceptualizations of territory, occasioned by historical
necessity. All contain the possibility of serious breaches of state sov-
ereignties. Also, the international accords concerning human rights
discussed above, which give a power of surveillance and even inter-
ference in some circumstances to international organizations,
contain the possibility of a breach of state sovereignties. Since these
international accords concern individuals and minorities only, ensu-
ing contraventions of sovereignty can be predicted to be slight.
Nonetheless, the fact that all of these potential contraventions of
sovereignty are tolerated is further evidence that international law is
moving towards a realization of undivided self-interest in interna-
tional cooperation and towards the redressing of its colonialist past.
These are hopeful signs, but the Western legal tradition must
reform itself further still. A significant first step it must take in fur-
thering this reform and thereby redressing its colonialist past is by
ceasing contemporary colonialist practices and attitudes, including
those that are unintended. This means allowing and encouraging the
internationalization, in some meaningful sense of the word, of inter-
national law and of the international organizations. As it is difficult
to think beyond our own logic, the best means of accomplishing this
is to make room in international law for non-Western concepts and
to allow their presence to contribute to its shape. More specifically,
one can recognize as political entities collectives, groups, peoples, or
nations who define themselves in accordance with their own criteria
and principles. Such recognition can occur either in place of, along-
side of, or within this concept of the sovereign state. Moreover, these
non-Western political entities can exist in confederal or federal ar-
rangements with states; in more extreme cases, these entities can
serve as members of organizations such as the United Nations that
are on an equal footing with states-as subjects rather than objects of
international law."'5 Stateless nations, such as Canada's First Na-
102. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
103. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122.
104. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 72.
105. The question of what constitutes a nation is more difficult, for example, when
applied to minorities as opposed to indigenous peoples whose sense of nationhood is
closely related to their history as victims of a colonial regime. See discussion supra note
41. Although the question of exactly when a community of people becomes a nation is
beyond the scope of this Essay, the recognition of legal status to stateless nations need
not usurp the present legal distinction between minorities (the members of which have
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tions, are currently neither recognized nor really even visible in in-
ternational law. Let them be recognized, let them be heard, let them
contribute. Colonialism will begin its end there, and this is in the
best interest of the state as well, whose legitimacy and whose con-
tinued survival reside in its representation of the peoples.
CONCLUSION
The question posed at the beginning of this Essay, as to the
possibility of a reconciliation between the demands for self-
government of Canada's First Nations and the interests of the Ca-
nadian state, has no simple answer. Two important conflicts exist
between them: First Nations traditions tend to privilege the collec-
tive while the state tends to privilege the individual, and First
Nations traditions generally conceive of territory as communally
owned while the territorial sovereignty of the state is much more
like individual ownership of land as it is known in Roman law. The
source of these conflicts can be found in the fact that under the
definition of current international law, Canada is a state while First
Nations are not and could not be states in the current legal sense of
the word without seriously departing from their traditional princi-
ples. In other words, First Nations concepts of political organization
are antithetical to the concept of the state in international law, which
is based upon the doctrine of sovereignty.
From here, one could hypothesize that the interests of the state
and the interests of First Nations are irreconcilable. That may be true
insofar as one rejects the possibility of reforming the state or of re-
forming international law. It is, however, possible to imagine the
egalitarian coexistence in international law of states and stateless
nations and thus of a reconciliation between these conflicting inter-
ests. Federalism, the legal structure on which Canada's sovereignty
depends, was itself an invention at one time, and involves a sharing
of power between levels of government that may well have once
been unimaginable. 10 6 International organizations, created in the
minority rights, such as the right to speak their own language) and peoples (who have
a right of self-determination). See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Members of
minorities who, subject to recognition of certain minority rights, are content with their
representation by the state in which they live could continue in their present relation-
ship to that state. Similarly, there may be indigenous peoples who prefer to be
considered members of a minority. However, one need not require that the term
"peoples" be reserved for those who once suffered colonialism, such as indigenous
peoples. Nations are by definition fluid and evolving entities, and consequently the
term need not be a closed proposition. According to the Center for World Indigenous
Studies, in 1993 there were 191 states, Definition of a State, supra note 13, while there
were between 7000 and 10,000 nations, Definition of a Nation, supra note 13.
106. As opposed to earlier notions of the nation-state, organized around the ex-
traordinarily simply principle of "one people, one government, one territory," Daniel
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post-war era in response to the realization that global problems need
global administration, offer another model. They are international
states, so to speak; an idea that may well have been inconceivable in
the nineteenth century. They have international jurisdictions and
this is directly in contravention of the territorial sovereignties of
states. This has been possible to organize by distinguishing certain
administrative jurisdictions from territorial jurisdictions. In other
words, in this case we have forgone the privileging of territory as the
defining factor and replaced it with functional definitions. It has
been possible because the exigencies of history required it.
The scope of possible reforms and adaptations to international
law is in fact very large, and the hypothesizing of new forms of or-
ganization is part of the work that remains to be done. International
law has proven capable in the past of fairly radical reconceptualiza-
tions of territory as events required. Current international law is
structurally unable to render justice as its subjects now define it.
Ours is now a post-colonial concept of justice where one no longer
forcibly applies Western criteria such as exclusively individual hu-
man rights, nor Western forms of organization such as the state, to
non-Western peoples on pain of their virtual nonexistence under
international law. This constitutes an historical development worthy
of once again mobilizing international law's capacity for invention.
J. Elazar, Introduction to FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL,
CONFEDERAL AND AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS, at xi (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991), fed-
eralism developed as a second or parallel model of state-building in order to
"accommodat[e] the spreading desire of people to preserve or revive the intimacy of
small societies and [as a result of] the growing necessity for larger combinations to
mobilize the utilization of common resources better," id. at xv.
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